Abstract-The Internet of Things (IoT) is increasingly empowering people with an interconnected world of physical objects ranging from smart buildings to portable smart devices, such as wearables. With recent advances in mobile sensing, wearables have become a rich collection of portable sensors and are able to provide various types of services, including tracking of health and fitness, making financial transactions, and unlocking smart locks and vehicles. Most of these services are delivered based on users' confidential and personal data, which are stored on these wearables. Existing explicit authentication approaches (i.e., PINs or pattern locks) for wearables suffer from several limitations, including small or no displays, risk of shoulder surfing, and users' recall burden. Oftentimes, users completely disable security features out of convenience. Therefore, there is a need for a burden-free (implicit) authentication mechanism for wearable device users based on easily obtainable biometric data. In this paper, we present an implicit wearable device user authentication mechanism using combinations of three types of coarse-grain minute-level biometrics: behavioral (step counts), physiological (heart rate), and hybrid (calorie burn and metabolic equivalent of task). From our analysis of over 400 Fitbit users from a 17-month long health study, we are able to authenticate subjects with average accuracy values of around .93 (sedentary) and .90 (non-sedentary) with equal error rates of .05 using binary SVM classifiers. Our findings also show that the hybrid biometrics perform better than other biometrics and behavioral biometrics do not have a significant impact, even during non-sedentary periods.
At the same time, smartphones and wearables have also advanced in their sensing and computational capabilities, which enable many new applications and usage scenarios. While smartphones are already widely used [1] , wearables are still growing in popularity with the arrival of new applications, including the ability to identify a user to third party services [2] , store sensitive user information (i.e., passwords, credit card information) [3] , unlock vehicles [3] , access phones and other paired devices [4] , manage financial payments [1] , monitor or track individuals (e.g., child monitoring or fall detection), and assess an individual's health and fitness. According to a recent market report [5] , a 72.7% increase in wearable shipments and an associated increase in sales revenue of 78.1% are predicted from 2016 to 2022.
However, wearables also raise new challenges, specifically in terms of security. Unauthorized access of a wearable can enable access to other sensitive IoT objects, which poses a significant risk [6] . Unauthorized users could also access data on the wearables, e.g., many applications and services provided by a wearable depend on sensor and user data stored on the device. Another concern is the reliability (i.e., trustworthiness) of the physiological and activity data collected by wearables, e.g., many healthcare providers and researchers rely on wearables to monitor their patients or study participants remotely, where users may be tempted to give their own devices to others, e.g., to reach a prescribed amount of activity or to contribute the required amount of data to maintain compliance and receive financial incentives [7] . Therefore, there is a need for robust and accurate authentication mechanisms specifically for wearable device users.
Existing wearable device authentication mechanisms are often knowledge-based regular PIN locks or pattern locks [3] , which suffer from a scalability issue [8] , i.e., with an increasing reliance on protected devices, a user is often flooded with passwords or PIN requeests to obtain access to various data and services. Knowledge-based approaches also require users to interact with the display, which may either be inconvenient or even completely absent in many wearables [6] , [8] . Many times, users opt to completely disable security mechanisms out of convenience. Furthermore, knowledge-based approaches suffer from observation attacks such as shoulder surfing [8] . Therefore, in recent years, biometric-based solutions have been proposed, since they provide opportunities for implicit authentication by removing direct user involvement or attention [6] , [8] . A market intelligence firm has also predicted that annual biometric hardware and software revenue will grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 22.9% from $2.4 billion in 2016 to $15.1 billion worldwide by 2025 [9] , which further provides evidence that there is an opportunity to utilize biometric-based authentication. However, biometric-based authentication also has challenges and shortcomings, specifically in terms of accuracy and usability. For example, behavioral biometric-based approaches such as gait or gesture analysis often fail to authenticate a user during sedentary periods [6] , [7] and physiological biometricbased approaches such as ECG or EEG signals require very precise samples from expensive sensors, which are not available on typical wearables (e.g., due to limited computational power and battery life [10] ).
The main contribution of this paper is an implicit wearable device user authentication approach using three different types of biometric data: behavioral biometrics (step counts), physiological biometrics (heart rate), and hybrid biometrics (calorie burn and metabolic equivalent of task or MET), all of which are easily obtainable on many state-of-the-art wearables. Our approach is to authenticate a user based on coarse-grained (i.e., one sample per minute instead of multiple samples per second or millisecond) processed (i.e., not raw) biometric data. Compared to our previous approach to authenticate users during non-sedentary periods using four different biometrics together [11] , [12] , in this paper we authenticate users during both sedentary and non-sedentary periods using different combinations of these four biometrics. In Section IV, we discuss the details of the proposed feature selection approaches, followed by the parameter optimization described in Section V-C.1. We train and test different authentication models with different feature sets using a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier in Section V-C.2, which was found to be the most accurate in our previous work [12] . Our analysis using data from over 400 Fitbit users shows that our multi-biometric-based implicit approach is able to authenticate subjects with an average accuracy of about .93 (sedentary) and .90 (non-sedentary) for a window size of 5 minutes, which is found to be a good compromise for implicit authentication using less informative processed biometric data compared to larger windows. We also find that the best feature sets obtained during both sedentary and non-sedentary periods consist of features from only the hybrid biometrics (i.e., calorie burn and MET), whereas the behavioral biometrics (i.e., step counts) do not have a significant impact on authentication even during non-sedentary periods. Using error analysis we demonstrate the trade-off between usability and security of our authentication approach.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Wearable Constraints
Wearable device user authentication is a relatively new research area compared to other mobile authentication [2] , [8] , [10] , [13] . Due to the limited computational capabilities and energy resources, most traditional user authentication approaches, e.g., using fingerprints [14] , voice [15] , breathing patterns [16] , keystroke dynamics [17] , head or arm movements [4] , gait [7] , electroencephalography (EEG) [18] , and electrocardiograms (ECG) [15] are often not suitable for wearable devices. Furthermore, low-cost sensors in wearables may be less accurate (leading to noisy data recordings) or collect recordings very infrequently (e.g., only once per minute) [10] . For example, most wearable health trackers make heart rate measurements only occasionally instead of collecting raw and much more detailed (but also more resource-costly) ECG measurements. The limited display sizes of wearables add another constraint that limits the choices of authentication mechanisms [2] , [12] .
B. Multi-Modal Biometric Authentication
Previous work has used combinations of multiple biometrics to form multi-modal biometric-based authentication systems for increased reliability compared to unimodal systems, which often suffer from noisy data, intra-class variations, inter-class similarities, and spoof attacks [19] . For these multi-modal authentication systems, researchers have measured different hard-and soft-biometrics, such as electroencephalography (EEG), electrooculography (EOG), electrocardiogram (EKG), phonecardiography (PCG), electromiography (EMG), photoplethysmography (PPG), face, fingerprint, finger knuckle print (FKP), finger vein, palmprint, iris, eyes, ear, lips, tongue, laser doppler vibrometry (LDV), speech, physical activity, gait, and gesture with fusion at different levels, such as feature, matching score, and sensor levels [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . However, due to the limited sensing capabilities and relatively low computational power of wearables, these multi-modal approaches are not suitable for implicit and continuous authentication on most state-of-the-art wearables.
C. Wearable Authentication
More recently researchers proposed authentication techniques that are more suitable for wearables, including approaches based on behavioral biometrics, such as gait [7] , [26] , [27] , gesture [28] , activity types [2] , [6] , and keystroke dynamics [17] and physiological biometrics, such as PPG signals [29] . Almost all of these studies are based on controlled data collections and the accuracy of these techniques has often been verified with limited numbers of subjects and over short time periods. All of these user authentication techniques are also context dependent, e.g., gaitbased behavioral authentication approaches [7] , [27] only work during walking. While other projects have addressed some of the limitations of gait-based approaches, e.g., by considering different types of gestures [28] or activities [2] , [6] , they still have other limitations, i.e., models developed for a specific set of gestures or activities fail to work with other sets [17] , [12] . Authentication approaches using physiological biometric data, such as heart rate and bioimpedance [13] require very finegrained samples and sensor readings are easily affected by noise, motion, etc.
In our previous work [12] , we presented a new multimodal biometric authentication approach for wearable device users. There, we used four different coarse-grained minutelevel biometric types (step counts, heart rate, calorie burn, and metabolic equivalent of task) for authentication. These types of data are easily obtainable from state-of-the-art wearables. We used activity intensities ranging from 1 (lightly active) to 3 (highly active) as an input feature to make the approach more generic. In this paper, we build upon our previous work and authenticate the users during both sedentary and nonsedentary periods using features from different combinations of the four different biometrics (instead of using all four biometrics together) to demonstrate the relative importance of different biometric combinations in a multi-modal authentication approach. In our analysis we show that calorie burn and MET are sufficient for authentication (instead of using all four biometrics together). While the accuracy and sampling rates of modern wearables are limited, we claim that measurements from multiple biometrics can still provide enough information to capture activity and fitness characteristics of an individual, thereby we can use the measurements to identify if a device is worn by its owner or another user. Another advantage of an authentication approach using biometric data is that such user identification can be performed implicitly without imposing any user burden, thereby providing non-stop authentication.
III. APPROACH
In this paper, we intend to demonstrate the importance and effectiveness of different coarse-grained minute-level biometrics to identify wearable-users using statistical analysis and machine learning modeling. Before we describe the details of the analysis, we first introduce the dataset, pre-processing steps, and methods used in this work.
A. NetHealth Study Dataset
The NetHealth mobile crowd sensing (MCS) study [11] , [12] , [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] began at the University of Notre Dame in 2015 with the purpose of investigating the impacts of "always-on connectivity" on the health habits, emotional wellness, and social ties of college students, over an extended period. For this study, over 400 individuals were recruited from the 2015 freshman class, using both e-mail and Facebook invites. The students were instructed to continuously wear a Fitbit Charge HR device that was provided to them. Further, they were given a data collection app for their iPhones. Both the Fitbit and the smartphone app collected data 24 hours a day. Occasionally, the students were also asked to respond to various types of surveys. All students participating in the study resided in on-campus dormitories during semesters and had an average age of 17 years and 11 months (SD = 11 months).
In this paper, we use data collected between July 24, 2015 and December 10, 2016 (i.e., 506 days or about 17 months). Figure 1a shows that more than 40% of the subjects participated for the entire period and about 20% contributed less than 4 months of data. This shows that we have a good number of subjects that participated during the entire period. Figure 1b shows that our dataset contains 18-22 hours of valid data (Section III-B.1) per person per day. On average we obtained about 20 hours (SD = 1.5 hours) of valid data per person per day, where 78.24%, 17.24%, 2.09%, and 2.43% are from the four activity levels sedentary, low, fair, and high, respectively. The data being collected by the Fitbit device include minute-level heart rate, calorie burn, metabolic equivalent of task or MET [41] , physical activity level/intensity (e.g., sedentary, light, fair, and high), step count, sleep status, and self-recorded activity labels. MET is the rate of energy consumption during a specific physical activity to a reference metabolic rate (i.e., metabolic rate during resting state). These collected data can be divided into three biometric groups: behavioral (e.g., step counts, activity level/intensity), physiological (e.g., heart rate) and hybrid (e.g., calorie burn, MET) biometrics, where hybrid biometrics are derived from both behavioral and physiological biometrics. We also collected different types of activity labels, e.g., walking, running, and biking, which are detected by Fitbit's SmartTrack activity detection module.
B. Data Pre-Processing and Feature Computation
Since we are using a real-world dataset, we first need to clean the dataset before using it. Then, we need to segment the continuous stream of biometrics, followed by feature computations before we can build authentication models.
1) Filtering Invalid Activity Data:
A Fitbit device collects heart rate data only when the device is actually worn, but the device collects activity data all the time, even if the device is not worn. Therefore, before we can use the activity data for our analysis, we need to remove "invalid" periods of activity minutes that do not match with periods of heart rate measurements. A similar filtering approach is applied for calorie burn and MET. For our analysis, we consider data from 421 Fitbit users.
2) Data Segmentation: For the classification task, we first segment continuous heart rate, calorie burn, MET, and step counts into five-minute non-overlapping windows starting from a change of activity levels. Since the sampling rate is one sample per minute, each window contains five consecutive samples.
When we segment the data into windows, we start from the beginning of an activity level and check for the next five minutes if the same activity level continues. With this approach, we set the reference point at the beginning of an activity level, since the biometrics vary across different activity levels. This approach also triggers authentication when there is a data gap (e.g., the device is worn after it is taken off) followed by a new activity level. Table I presents the candidate feature set, where mean frequency ( f _μ) and median frequency ( f _Mdn) (measured in radians/sec) are estimates of mean and median normalized angular frequency of the power spectrum of a time-domain signal [42] , [43] . Energy of a signal is the sum of the absolute squares of its time-domain samples and power of a signal is the average energy. Mean and median absolute deviations of a time-domain signal X are defined as mean(|X − mean(X)|) and medi an(|X − medi an(X)|), respectively. Pearson's moment coefficient of skewness (γ ) and kurtosis (κ) are used to measure the symmetry of a distribution around its mean and shape of the distribution, respectively, and defined as 2 , respectively, where E is the expectation operator and μ is the mean of signal X. We compute 108 features for each window, when considering all four biometrics together. These features are computed using Matlab signal processing toolbox functions [44] . For non-sedentary periods, we also consider the activity level (i.e., light, fair, and high) as an additional feature. Therefore, we can have a maximum of 109 features for each window during non-sedentary periods compared to 108 features during sedentary periods.
3) Feature Computation:
In Table II , we present different symbols that we use in the rest of this paper. Additionally, each biometric is referred to by its initial: "C" (calorie burn), "S" (step counts), "M" (MET), and "H" (heart rate). Combinations of these letters are used to represent the corresponding combinations of the biometrics, e.g., "CH" represents a combination of calorie burn and heart rate. Therefore, b ∈ {C, S, M, H, CS, CM, CH, SM, SH, MH, CSM, CSH, CMH, SMH, CSMH}. As examples, F C0 5 and F C H0 7 represent two feature sets of 5 and 7 features, respectively, that are obtained from only the calorie burn and a combination of calorie burn and heart rate during sedentary (i.e., l = 0) periods.
C. Methods
We propose an implicit and reliable wearable-user authentication scheme that relies on person-dependent biometrics that are widely available on state-of-the-art wearables. We first present a detailed feature selection approach (Section IV) and then, we present a detailed performance analysis of different feature sets that are obtained from various combinations of the four biometrics, using a support vector machine (SVM) classification models (Section V), which were found to achieve the best performance when identifying users of wearable devices using less informative coarse-grained biometric data [12] . For all analysis steps we use minute-level heart rate, calorie burn, step counts, and MET.
IV. FEATURE SELECTION
First, we apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-test [45] to select significant features from the candidate feature sets consisting of 27 features from each of the four biometrics. Then, we apply two separate approaches to reduce the feature count -(1) remove redundant features using the Pearson Correlationbased approach [45] and (2) reduce the feature count using Standard Deviation-based feature selection approach.
A. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test-Based Approach
To find important features, we use the Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-test with the null hypothesis H 0 : "the two data sets are from the same distribution." For each feature, we calculate the p − value for data points from each pair of subjects and drop a feature if most of its p − values are higher than α.
To determine a significant feature we first draw a boxplot of log 10 ( p − values) to compare all subject-pairs for a particular feature. We then compare the five measures of the boxplot (i.e., lower and upper adjacents, and three percentiles) with log 10 (α). The more important a feature is, the more of its boxplot is below log 10 (α), i.e., more subject-pairs are significantly different. From our investigation, we observe that a reasonable number (i.e., neither too few nor too many) of the features are obtained when comparing the 75 th percentile of log 10 ( p − values) with log 10 (α). Therefore, we select a set of features for each of which the 75 th percentile of log 10 ( p − values) is lower than log 10 (α). Figure 2 shows the KS-test results for the candidate set of 108 features (Table I ) from all biometrics in general, i.e., considering both sedentary and non-sedentary periods. We obtain a total of 65 significant features from the candidate Fig. 2 . Results of the KS-test on the candidate set of 108 features (Table I) set. In the figure we observe that calorie burn, MET, and heart rate have more significant features than step counts in general. This is because the data include sedentary minutes. From further investigation we observe that during sedentary periods we obtain a set of 72 significant features consisting of 34.72% "C", 33.33% "M", and 31.95% "H" features. The behavioral biometric (step counts) has no significant feature during sedentary periods. Compared to sedentary periods, we obtain a set of 60 significant features that is comprised of 28.33% "C", 36.67% "S", 16.67% "M", and 18.33% "H" features during non-sedentary periods. Therefore, the behavioral biometric contributes to a good number of significant features during non-sedentary periods.
B. Pearson Correlation Coefficient-Based Approach
In the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PC)-based approach we find redundant features using correlation between each pair of features that were obtained from the previous step, i.e., K S bl n (obtained using the KS-test in Section IV-A). If a pair of features has a strong correlation, these features are redundant, i.e., they are capturing similar information about the subjects. On the other hand, a weak correlation indicates that features reflect different types of information of the subjects. Therefore, we want to remove highly correlated redundant features, while keeping features that are weakly correlated.
We first compute the correlation coefficient between pairs of features of a particular biometric. Then, we select feature-pairs that have correlation values higher than r (defined in Table II) and statistically significant, i.e., p − value < α. Next, for each of these strongly correlated feature-i , we compute the number of other feature-j that are correlated with feature-i , where j = i , and then rank the correlated features in decreasing order of their associated counts. Finally, redundant features with higher counts are discarded from the top of the list.
After the final ranking of strongly correlated (i.e., redundant) features, we remove the top x r percent features from a set. In Section V-C.1, we present the optimal values of x r based on different r .
C. Standard Deviation-Based Approach
We apply the standard deviation (SD)-based feature selection approach on K S bl n feature sets that are obtained from the KS-test in Section IV-A. The feature that varies more (i.e., higher standard deviation) across subjects has a higher chance of capturing subject varying information, i.e., it can be an influential feature and can better distinguish the subjects, compared to less influential features that do not vary much.
First, for each feature f i , we compute the coefficient of variation
Next, we rank each feature using two approaches and then combine the ranks. In our first ranking approach, we determine the ranks of all features in descending order of their cov values computed across all subjects. We rank features using feature sets from each biometric separately, and also as combination of different biometrics.
In our second ranking approach, for each feature-i and subject-j , we first compute the range R , where ∀ j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k = j . This count reflects the number of subjects that may be misidentified as another subject. Therefore, features with lower counts are better in distinguishing subjectpairs. We rank features of each biometric in an increasing order of counts.
Finally, we combine the ranks of each feature using a uniform weighted average and sort them in an increasing order of combined ranks. We perform this weighted ranking for the feature sets from each biometric separately, and for combinations of different biometrics.
After final ranking, we take the top x σ r percent features of a set. In Section V-C.1, we present the optimal values of x σ r . Table III presents three sample feature sets obtained from the three feature selection approaches.
V. USER AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we analyze the performance of different feature sets using (1) the binary Quadratic Support Vector Machine (q-svm), i.e., SVM with a second order polynomial kernel function defined as K (x i , x j ) = (1 + γ x T i x j ) d and (2) the unary Gaussian Support Vector Machine (g-svm), i.e., SVM with the Gaussian or Radial Basis Function (RBF) defined as K (x i , x j ) = ex p(−γ x T i x j ), where kernel scale parameter γ = 1, degree d = 2, and x i and x j are two feature vectors/windows. We also set the miss-classification cost/penalty, C = 1. For the unary classifier we vary the outlier count from 0% to 50% with a step size of 5% (Section V-C.3) at ν = .5. We use iterations between optimization diagnostic message output, 0 kernel offset, Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) [46] with a tolerance value of .001 for the gradient difference, maximum 10 6 number of numerical optimization iterations, 0 tolerance for the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker complementarity conditions violation. Initial estimates of α coefficients are set to all 0 (binary classifiers) and .5 (unary classifiers). In our experiments, q-svm and g-svm are found to be the best classifiers for the binary and unary authentications, respectively.
A. Training-Testing Set
To avoid overfitting, the number of valid windows that we consider per subject per feature set is at least 10 times the number of features in the set. For each feature set F bl n (symbols have their meaning as defined in Table II) , we further balance the dataset by selecting N subjects each having the same |W | number of random windows, where |W | = mi n(∀ j : |W j | ≥ 10 × |F bl n |). |F bl n | is the feature count of set F bl n , and |W j | is the number of valid windows obtained from subject-j for the feature set F bl n . Therefore, in case of a window size of 5 minutes we are using 5 × |W | minutes of data from one of the four biometrics (i.e., "C", "M", "H", and "S") from each subject. Next, we split the entire dataset into 75% & 25% for training and testing.
B. Performance Measures
To evaluate the performance of different feature sets we consider the following measures: Accuracy (ACC), which is the fraction of predictions that are correct, i.e.,
ACC = T P + T N T P + F N + F P + T N (1)
False Positive Rate (FPR), which is the fraction of invalid users accepted by an authentication system, i.e.:
False Negative Rate (FNR), which is the fraction of genuine users rejected by an authentication system, i.e.:
where terminologies used in Equations 1, 2, and 3 have their usual meaning in machine learning, when classifying a subject using the feature set F bl n . Therefore, a desirable authentication system should have both lower FPR and FNR, but higher ACC. We also use Equal Error Rate (EER), which is defined as the point when FNR and FPR are equal, i.e., a trade-off between the two error measures (i.e., FNR and FPR). Note that literature often also uses False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR), which are exactly the same as FPR and FNR, respectively.
In addition to all these standard measures, we consider the following measure:
Feature Count Decrease (FCD) (in %), which is a measure of improvement in feature count that a feature selection approach can achieve. We define the Feature Count Decrease of a feature set F bl n using the following formula:
where |F bl n | is the total number of features in a set F bl n obtained using the F feature selection approach. -sedentary) , i.e., the maximum number of features a set can have. If two feature sets achieve the same accuracy, then the set with higher FCD, i.e., lower feature count, is better since it will lower the computational load, but achieves the same accuracy as the other set. When using ACC with FCD to compare different feature sets in Figures 3 and 4 , we use percent (%).
C. User Authentication Models
For each feature set F bl n with N subjects we build N separate models, one for each subject. When using the binary q-svm classifier, we train a model with a positive class consisting of one subject's data (i.e., 75% × |W | random windows) and a negative class consisting of data from the rest of the N − 1 subjects with 75% × |W |/(N − 1) random windows from each subject. However, when using the unary (i.e., 1-class) g-svm classifier, we train a model using a subject's own data with a certain percentage of data being considered as outliers. For both types of classifiers, we test a model on of the 25% data from a particular subject as positive class and 25% data from rest of N − 1 subjects as negative class. In all cases, we use balanced datasets as explained previously in Section V-A. This way we obtain N performance measures (discussed in Section V-B) when authenticating a subject from the rest of the N − 1 subjects. For comparison, we also compute averages and standard deviations of these N measures. Each subject is identified by an anonymous subject ID. We perform wearable device user authentication separately for sedentary and non-sedentary periods. In the next sections we present a detailed analysis of our implicit authentication models.
1) Finding Optimal Parameter Sets:
To find the optimal parameter set for each feature selection approach, we first compute the average of all ACC and FCD values obtained for all possible combinations of subjects and biometrics. Then graphically we determine the optimal parameter setting with a goal to find a parameter setting where both ACC and FCD achieve high values. Figure 3 shows an example of the parameter selection approach during sedentary periods for the Standard Deviation-based feature selection approach (Section IV-C). In the figure we observe that with increasing x σ r threshold values, the average ACC increases, but FCD decreases. We observe that at x σ r = 40% ACC reaches saturation, but FCD keeps dropping. However, for non-sedentary periods we find x σ r = 50% to be a good choice. Similarly, for the Pearson Correlation Coefficient-based approach (Section IV-B) we obtain x r = 30% (sedentary) and x r = 50% (non-sedentary) at r = .95 are a good compromise.
2) Comparing Biometrics and Feature Selection Approaches: First, we investigate how classifier performance varies across different biometrics for the same feature selection approach. Figure 4a and 4b show the ACC and FCD variation across different biometrics of KS-based feature sets when applying the q-svm classifier. In the figure, each subplot corresponds to an optimal parameter set obtained in Section V-C.1. We observe that b = C M (Figures 4a and 4b SD-approach. We investigate the statistical significance between b = C SM H and b = C M H for the SD-approach during non-sedentary periods. We perform the Two-Sample t-Test with a null hypothesis: "H 0 : μ 1 = μ 2 ", where μ 1 and μ 2 are the average accuracy values of feature sets associated with b = C SM H and b = C M H , respectively. We fail to reject the null hypothesis with p − value > α and there is no significant accuracy difference between the two feature sets. Therefore, in general "S" (step counts) is redundant and does not improve ACC significantly compared to what can be obtained using the other three biometrics, i.e., "C" (calorie burn), "M" (MET), and "H" (heart rate). Table IV summarizes the findings when applying q-svm on the three feature selection approaches. In the table we observe that the KS-and SD-based approaches achieve similar performance. We further investigate the difference among the three approaches using probability distribution of authentication accuracy values. In Figure 4c we observe that during sedentary periods, the KS-and SD-based approaches have more instances in the range .9 -1 compared to the PC-based approach. Therefore, KS-and SD-based approaches perform better than the PC-based approach. In all three approaches, most of the samples are classified with accuracy values in the range .8 -1. We observe similar graphs for non-sedentary periods. In Figure 4 and Table IV we observe that in general hybrid biometrics (i.e., "C" and "M") perform better than other behavioral ("S") and physiological ("H") biometrics, which happens because hybrid biometrics are derived from both behavioral and physiological biometrics in addition to demographic data such as weight and age of a user. Therefore, it can be a better idea to develop authentication systems based on hybrid biometrics such as calorie burn and MET instead of existing behavioral or physiological biometricsbased approaches.
3) Binary Versus Unary Classification: In Table IV we present the authentication summary using both binary q-svm and unary g-svm models. The unary classifiers in the table are built without considering any outlier, i.e., 0% outlier. We observe that the unary models achieve performance close to binary classification models for the KS-and SD-based approaches during sedentary periods. However, for nonsedentary periods, the difference between the two classification models is relatively high compared to sedentary periods. This is probably due to the variations of window counts across the three non-sedentary activity levels of individuals.
In Figure 5a we vary the thresholds of the percentage of valid data of a user that are considered as outliers ranging from 0 to 50%. In the figure we observe that FPR goes below .05 with ≈10% and ≈30% outliers during sedentary and non-sedentary period models. With the consideration of more outliers, FPR is improving for both models, but this increase quickly raises FNR in both cases. Therefore, when building authentication models using unary classifiers, we should consider ≈10% and ≈30% outliers during sedentary and nonsedentary period models to obtain a better FPR.
4) Error Analysis:
Since KS-and SD-based approaches have similar performance (Table IV in Section V-C.2), for our analysis in this section we consider the KS-based approach with b = C M. In Table IV we do not consider the confidence level of a prediction when applying a trained model on test data. However, in this section we take into account the confidence level of a prediction in terms of a posterior probability, which indicates the likelihood of the prediction coming from a particular class.
Figures 5b and 5c show the variation of performance measures (i.e., FPR, FNR, and ACC) with the variation of probability thresholds starting from .5 up to 1 with an increase of .00001 at each step. For a particular threshold we consider only those predictions that have posterior probability higher than the threshold. In Figure 5b we observe that during nonsedentary periods the authentication system has a low FNR of ≈ .07, but a high FPR of ≈ .14 with ACC ≈ .89 when considering predictions with a threshold value of .5. However, with the increase of the probability threshold, FPR starts dropping sharply, while FNR and ACC increase steadily. After .9 probability all three measures change sharply. At a probability threshold of ≈.95, we obtain an EER of ≈.05. When FPR drops to .02, FNR increases to ≈.1. At that point ACC increases above .97. For sedentary periods we observe similar patterns. In Figure 5c we observe that during sedentary periods the authentication system has a low FNR of ≈.05, but a high FPR of ≈.1 with ACC ≈.92 at probability values higher than .5. At a probability threshold of .95, we obtain an EER of ≈.05. When FPR drops to .02, FNR increases to ≈.08. At that point ACC increases above .97. This way a trade-off can be made between FPR and FNR to balance security (in terms of FPR) and usability (in terms of FNR) of an implicit authentication system for wearable device users depending on application scenario and user preference. We also observe that at low probability thresholds we achieve better FPR during sedentary periods compared to nonsedentary periods, which shows the robustness of sedentary models compared to non-sedentary models.
5) Window Size Variation Effect on Error Rates:
In Figure 6 we observe that with an increase of window size the difference between FNR and FPR reduces for probability thresholds around .5. Further, all three measures change steadily up to probability thresholds of ≈.9, which is consistent with our earlier findings for the 5 minute windows in Figure 5c . We observe that 5 minute windows have a better EER compared to larger windows. We also observe similar FNR and ACC values across different window sizes when FPR values drop below .02. Since the findings in Figures 5c and 6 are not significantly different and 5 minute windows have a lower EER than others, 5 minute windows of processed biometric data appears to be a good choice compared to longer windows. Longer windows also incur long delays in accumulating all data points of a window and computing the features.
6) Temporal Effect on Authentication Performance:
In this analysis, we train-test each model with a sequence of time ordered windows, i.e., the first 75% are used for training and the remaining 25% are used for testing. We use the KS-approach with b = C M. We observe a better authentication performance, e.g., for non-sedentary periods we obtain an average ACC = .9147, FPR = .1215, and FNR = .0490 using a sequential approach compared to average ACC = .8961, FPR = .1408, and FNR = .0670 when we train-test using random windows. Similarly, for sedentary periods we obtain an average ACC = .9285, FPR = .0961, and FNR = .0468 (sequential) compared to average ACC = .9247, FPR = .1019, and FNR = .0486 (random). These findings show the time variability nature of biometrics. A potential takeaway can be to retrain authentication models over time based on one's biometric changes. VI. DISCUSSION Importance of Different Biometrics: Our preliminary analysis shows that behavioral biometric data (step counts) do not play a significant role even during non-sedentary periods. In contrast, hybrid biometrics (i.e., calorie burn and MET) achieve the best performance considering ACC, FCD, FPR, and FNR. This is because hybrid biometrics are derived from both behavioral and physiological biometrics. Therefore, in future biometric-based authentication modeling, hybrid biometrics would be a preferable option compared to approaches relying on behavioral and physiological biometrics.
Sensitivity of Usability and Security to Window Size:
We also discussed the trade-off between the usability (in terms of FNR) and security (in terms of FPR), which may be chosen depending on the needs of the users or applications. Surprisingly, we observe that for less informative processed coarse-grained data, increasing the window size does not make a significant difference in model performance. We have found that 5 minute windows provide a good compromise compared to longer windows. Non-Sedentary Period Performance Variation: Our current non-sedentary models with three activity levels (i.e., light, fair, and high) as input feature can authenticate users with an average accuracy of ≈.9, i.e., a misclassification rate of ≈.1. We further investigated the classifier performance for calorie burn and MET biometrics using the KS-based feature selection approach. We observe average misclassification rates of around .06, .1, and .15 for activity levels low, fair, and high, respectively, which demonstrates a degradation of performance for highly active periods. This indicates the need for a better modeling, e.g., separate models for different activity levels, which our current dataset does not support due to the lack of sufficient numbers of highly active samples. We also investigated the distribution of misclassified windows among the three non-sedentary activity levels. We observe around 68%, 8%, and 24% of the total misclassified windows are from low, fair, and high activity levels, respectively. This is because the light activity level has more samples than other non-sedentary activity levels. Generalization Using Activity Levels: During data collections, we typically do not impose any constraints since those could affect the data quality. In such uncontrolled studies, it is also difficult to obtain reliable ground truth data, especially for less common contexts and activities. Coarsegrained physiological data may also not be good enough to infer instantaneous events such as stress levels. However, we consider the activity level as a feature in our models, which therefore takes into account the fluctuations in the biometrics caused by changes to activity levels. In our case, we consider activity levels instead of activity types as reference when we segment continuous time-series data into windows and computing features. This generalizes our models to any unknown activity type since all types of activities belong to one of the four major activity levels (i.e., sedentary, low, fair, and high) that we use in our modeling. Therefore, our models also cover the changes of biometric variation due to activity changes. This way we are able to remove the limitations associated with activity type-based biometric modeling. Use of Coarse-Grained Homogeneous Biometrics: We show that using multiple less informative coarse-grained biometrics can still provide an implicit authentication system that is able to achieve very promising performance. This type of coarse-grained data-based authentication is very useful for devices such as wearables that may have limited computational capabilities, noisy sensors, and limited battery power.
Further, note that the dataset used in this paper is rather homogeneous in that the participants are all of similar age. This also means that the biometric patterns of the subject may be similar, which may negatively impact the accuracy. That is, we expect that analysis across wider age ranges would yield higher accuracies due to the natural changes in users' biometric data as they age. However additional data would be needed to confirm this claim (which we leave as future work). Robustness Against Attacks: Further note that in this manuscript we focus on the "lunch time" zero-effort attack. Online attacks such as attacks on the communication protocol are beyond the scope of our work. Furthermore, in a severe physical-level attack the attacker may inject synthetic data (such as fake step counts) that resemble data from an actual human, but that are still detectable by our authentication models since each model is built using a particular user's biometric pattern at different activity levels. These in turn are quite different between users as shown through the Two-sample t-Test and performance analysis of our models. Also, from our analysis we have shown that use of multiple biometrics improves the robustness of authentication. Need for Retraining: Biometric-based authentication models require occasional retraining to account for changes in one's biometrics. While not the focus of the work described in this paper, a meaningful retraining interval should consider potential changes in a user's physical characteristics (e.g., weight) or fitness levels. Typically, a retraining interval of about a week or a few weeks should be sufficient to account for such changes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
To our best knowledge, our work is the first to use three different types of less informative coarse-grained processed biometric data (i.e., behavioral, physiological, and hybrid) to accurately authenticate the wearable-users implicitly during both sedentary and non-sedentary periods. Our detailed analysis shows the effectiveness and importance of different biometrics and feature selection approaches. In our future work, we plan to determine and integrate various human and spatio-temporal factors that can improve both the feature selection and authentication performance. We also plan to work on determining appropriate model retraining periods for individuals depending on how quickly people may change due to weight loss or changes in exercise regimens, etc.
